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UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
DOCTRINE OF PATENT EXHAUSTION AND SELF-REPLICATING 
TECHNOLOGIES AFTER BOWMAN V. MONSANTO CO. 
INTRODUCTION 
The agriculture industry has changed significantly over the last thirty 
years.1 Surprisingly, however, farming in the United States remains a family 
business.2 In 2007, ninety-eight percent of farms were classified as family 
organizations.3 Nevertheless, these farming operations have evolved to the 
point that fewer, larger operations produce the majority of agricultural 
commodities.4 In addition, production per farm has increased over time, 
allowing greater yields from less acreage.5 
One of the most dramatic changes for the agriculture industry was the 
development of genetically engineered (GE) crops, which were introduced 
commercially in 1996.6 GE crops have helped the agriculture industry and 
other industries through reduced costs for food or drug production, reduced 
pesticide use, enhanced nutrient composition and food quality, resistance to 
 
 1. ERS Bulletin EIB-88, The Changing Organization of U.S. Farming 1 (U.S.D.A. 2011), 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/176816/eib88_1_.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 22. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 44. According to the Commodity Exchange Act, agricultural commodity means: 
(1) The following commodities specifically enumerated in the definition of a 
“commodity” found in section 1a of the Act: Wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, 
flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), 
wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean 
oil and all other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean 
meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, but not onions; 
(2) All other commodities that are, or once were, or are derived from, living organisms, 
including plant, animal and aquatic life, which are generally fungible, within their 
respective classes, and are used primarily for human food, shelter, animal feed or natural 
fiber; (3) Tobacco, products of horticulture, and such other commodities used or 
consumed by animals or humans as the Commission may by rule, regulation or order 
designate after notice and opportunity for hearing; and (4) Commodity-based indexes 
based wholly or principally on underlying agricultural commodities. 
17 C.F.R. § 1.3(zz) (2013). 
 5. ERS Bulletin EIB-88, supra note 1, at 44–45. 
 6. Graham Brookes & Peter Barfoot, GM Crops: The Global Economic and Environmental 
Impact—The First Nine Years 1996–2004, 8 J. AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY MGMT. & ECON. 187, 187 
(2005), available at http://www.agbioforum.org/v8n23/v8n23a15-brookes.pdf. 
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pests and disease, greater food security, and various medical benefits.7 In 2004, 
the global farm income benefit from GE crops, including second season 
soybeans in Argentina, was $6.5 billion.8 The largest income benefit during 
that same year was from herbicide-tolerant soybeans, which added $4.14 
billion in additional income.9 Furthermore, from 1996 to 2004, the farm 
income benefit from herbicide-tolerant soybeans in the United States alone was 
approximately $6.4 billion.10 While companies that hold utility patents on GE 
plants are often blamed for restricting farmers’ rights,11 the farmers have 
obviously benefited from the availability of GE crops.12 On average, studies 
have shown that patent holders retain only one-third of the benefits of first-
generation GE crops, whereas two-thirds of the benefits were shared 
“downstream” with consumers or purchasers of the GE crops.13 
In addition to income, GE crops have created other benefits for agriculture, 
including decreased pesticide usage, utilization of less toxic herbicides, 
reduced inputs such as machinery, fuel, and labor, and environmental 
benefits.14 From 1982 to 2007, farmers in the United States used thirty percent 
less hired labor while increasing farm output by thirty-five percent.15 During 
this same time period, the total number of acres used for agricultural purposes 
decreased five percent.16 
 
 7. Theresa Phillips, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs): Transgenic Crops and 
Recombinant DNA Technology, NATURE EDUC. (2008), http://www.nature.com/scitable/topic 
page/genetically-modified-organisms-gmos-transgenic-crops-nbsp-732. 
 8. Brookes & Barfoot, supra note 6, at 191. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 192 tbl.5. 
 11. See Jessica Lynd, Comment, Gone with the Wind: Why Even Utility Patents Cannot 
Fence in Self-Replicating Technologies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 663, 664–65 (2013). 
 12. See Henry I. Miller & Graham Brookes, Debunking ‘The Big Lie’ About Genetically 
Engineered Crops, FORBES (May 23, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/henrymiller/ 
2013/05/23/debunking-the-big-lie-about-genetically-engineered-crops/ (“Farmers certainly don’t 
believe that genetic engineering is unwanted, unneeded or unsuccessful. The net economic benefit 
at the farm level in 2011 was $19.8 billion, equal to an average income premium of $329/acre. 
For the 16 year period 1996–2011, the global farm income gain was $98.2 billion. Of the total 
farm income benefit, 49% ($48 billion) was due to yield gains resulting from lower pest and weed 
pressure and improved genetics, with the balance arising from reductions in the cost of 
production.”). 
 13. Phillips, supra note 7. 
 14. Martin Qaim, The Benefits of Genetically Modified Crops—and the Costs of Inefficient 
Regulation, RFF Policy Commentary, RESOURCES FOR FUTURE (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.r 
ff.org/Publications/WPC/Pages/The-Benefits-of-Genetically-Modified-Crops-and-the-Costs-of-In 
efficient-Regulation.aspx. 
 15. ERS Bulletin EIB-88, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
 16. Id. at 12. 
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Many of the same agricultural benefits can be observed, with some minor 
differences, in both developed and developing nations.17 As the world’s 
population continues to grow,18 farmers need advancements in technology in 
order to increase production levels from the same amount of tillable acres.19 
Productivity growth in agriculture has been achieved largely with 
technological advancements, including management, equipment, and GE 
plants.20 Without the availability of GE crops, maintaining global crop 
production levels at 2011 levels would have required planting an additional 
nine percent of the arable land in the United States, including 13.3 million 
acres of soybeans alone.21 While herbicide-tolerant crops have been 
particularly important for increased efficiency and production, development is 
currently underway for the next generation of GE technology.22 These crop 
developments include virus and fungus resistance, cold tolerance, drought 
resistance, and improved seed quality through protein, oil, or vitamin content.23 
In order to promote innovation in genetics and biotechnology,24 developers 
of GE plants may obtain utility patents for plant tissue, seeds, or whole 
plants.25 Seed companies who own the patent rights for GE plants use utility 
patents in conjunction with license agreements to restrict a farmer’s use of 
patented GE plants.26 These restrictions, inter alia, prevent farmers from saving 
 
 17. Qaim, supra note 14. 
 18. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, 
Volume 1: Comprehensive Tables, at xviii, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/336 (2013) (“In July 2013, 
the world population will reach 7.2 billion, 648 million more than in 2005 or an average gain of 
81 million persons annually.”). 
 19. ERS Bulletin EIB-88, supra note 1, at 65 & tbl.4.3. The agriculture industry relies on 
improvements in technology for growth more than almost any other section of the U.S. economy. 
Id. From 1960 to 2004, the growth in total factor productivity (TFP), which is a statistical series 
used to isolate the effect of changes in technology and related factors on output, accounted for 
13% of growth in industrial output; however, during this period, TFP accounted for 117% of the 
growth in agricultural output. Id. 
 20. Id. at 51. 
 21. Miller & Brookes, supra note 12. 
 22. ERS Bulletin EIB-88, supra note 1, at 51. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980). Patent laws promote progress 
by offering incentives to investors for a limited time, and this “authority of Congress is exercised 
in the hope that ‘[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society 
through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the 
emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.’” Id. (quoting 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974)). 
 25. See J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 132 (2001); Ex parte 
Hibberd, 1985 WL 71986, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 18, 1985). 
 26. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 128; see also Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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for replanting any seed produced from patented product.27 In Bowman v. 
Monsanto Co.,28 the United States Supreme Court concluded that patent rights 
apply when a farmer plants commodity soybean seed29 and saves and replants 
seeds harvested from that commodity seed.30 Moreover, the Court concluded 
that the doctrine of patent exhaustion did not apply because the doctrine does 
not restrict a patentee from preventing the buyer from making copies of the 
patented product.31 In the subsequent sections, this Note discusses patent rights 
and the patent exhaustion doctrine as applied by the Supreme Court in 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. and argues that the Court correctly concluded that 
the patent exhaustion doctrine does not apply to self-replicating technologies in 
this context.32 
In support of this argument, Part I of this Note outlines the development of 
patent law and the application of the doctrine of patent exhaustion as a defense 
in patent infringement lawsuits. In addition, Part I discusses the broadening of 
the scope of utility patents to include GE plants as patentable subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Lastly, Part I addresses the use of license 
agreements in conjunction with patented GE plants and the application of 
patent exhaustion in the context of GE plants. 
Part II of this Note summarizes the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Bowman case, as well as provides necessary background from the district court 
and Federal Circuit decisions. Part III argues that the Court’s holding that the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion was inapplicable to the factual situation of this 
case was correct. Moreover, while the Court’s decision effectively removes the 
farmer’s option to plant and save commodity seed, it consequently promotes 
the purpose of patents to encourage and protect innovation. Lastly, Part III 
endorses the Court’s narrow holding and discusses generally the application of 
the patent exhaustion doctrine to self-replicating technologies. 
 
 27. See Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333 (noting that Monsanto required growers to sign a license 
agreement or “Technology Agreement” that (1) required growers to only use Monsanto’s 
biotechnology seed for a single crop, (2) prohibited transfer or re-use of seed containing 
biotechnology for replanting, (3) prohibited research or experimentation, and (4) required 
payment of a technology fee); see also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002). 
 28. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). 
 29. “Commodity seeds are a mixture of undifferentiated seeds harvested from various 
sources, including from farms that grow Roundup Ready® soybeans and those that do not, 
although nearly ninety-four percent of Indiana’s acres of soybeans planted in 2007 were planted 
using herbicide resistant varieties.” Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 30. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769 (explaining commodity seed was purchased from a grain 
elevator that purchases grain from farmers and resells that grain for human and animal 
consumption). 
 31. Id. at 1766. 
 32. Id. at 1769. 
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I.  HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Development of Plant Utility Patents 
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to provide 
authors and inventors with “the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings 
and [d]iscoveries” for a limited time, for the purpose of promoting science and 
the arts.33 Under this constitutional power, Congress enacted the first patent 
statute in 1790.34 According to the iteration of this statutory authority 
applicable at the time of Bowman, a patent grants the patentee “the right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented 
product.35 Patent protection, however, only applies to established categories of 
patentable subject matter, including “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof.”36 
1. Scope of Utility Patents 
Congress intended that patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 be 
interpreted broadly to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.”37 
In addition, the Supreme Court concluded that the terms “manufacture” and 
“composition of matter” under § 101, as modified by “any,” “plainly 
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”38 A distinction 
exists between those “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none”39 and the “nonnaturally occurring manufacture or 
composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive 
name, character [and] use.’”40 Therefore, the relevant inquiry for patentable 
 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause provides a constitutional basis for rights granted 
under patent and copyright law. 
 34. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § OV-2 (2014). 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). The patent term expires twenty years after the earliest 
effective filing date. Id. § 154(a)(2). 
 36. Id. § 101. 
 37. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (determining that a genetically 
engineered bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil was a non-
naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter and thus patentable subject matter). 
 38. Id. at 308. In concluding that the legislature’s statutory language in defining patentable 
subject matter was unambiguous, the Court noted that “[t]he subject-matter provision of the 
patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of 
promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all that means for the social and 
economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.” Id. at 315. 
 39. Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
 40. Id. at 309–10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
192 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:187 
subject matter is whether the invention is a product of nature or man-made, not 
whether the product is living or inanimate.41 
2. Utility Patents, Plant Patents, and the Plant Variety Protection Act 
In 1930, Congress enacted the Plant Patent Act (PPA)42 providing patent 
protection for a person who “invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any 
distinct and new variety of plant.”43 A new variety of plant is patentable under 
the PPA if it meets the requirements under § 101, except for the description 
requirement as outlined in § 162.44 In addition, in 1970 Congress passed the 
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA),45 which provided that a “breeder of any 
sexually reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety . . . shall be entitled to 
plant variety protection for the variety.”46 Under this Act, Congress authorized 
patent-like protection for sexually reproduced varieties, but the PVPA provides 
a narrower scope of protection than a utility patent.47 
In 1986, the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences, relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, found that plants are patentable subject matter under 
§ 101, and the PPA and PVPA are not the exclusive forms of protection for 
plants.48 Later, the Supreme Court also concluded the PPA and PVPA are not 
the exclusive means to obtain a right to exclude others from using, selling, or 
reproducing plants.49 Therefore, utility patents may be issued for plants, 
provided the requirements under § 101 are met.50 
B. The Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion 
1. Initial Sale Terminates Patent Rights 
A patentee has exclusive rights and may prevent a person from making, 
selling, or using the patented product.51 A person who, “without authority 
 
 41. Id. at 313. 
 42. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–64 (2006); see J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 
124, 133 (2001) (stating that plant patents provide exclusive protection to the asexual 
reproduction of the plant and also include a relaxation of the description requirement). 
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 161. 
 44. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 133 & n.6. See also 35 U.S.C. § 162 (“No plant patent 
shall be declared invalid for noncompliance with section 112 if the description is as complete as 
is reasonably possible.”). 
 45. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2006). 
 46. Id. § 2402(a). 
 47. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 138. 
 48. See Ex parte Hibberd, 1985 WL 71986, at *2–3 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 18, 1985). 
 49. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 145. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Van Kannell Revolving Door Co. v. Revolving Door & Fixture Co., 293 F. 261, 262 
(S.D.N.Y. 1920). 
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makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United 
States or import into the United States any patented invention during the term 
of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”52 Under the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion or “first sale” doctrine, the patent owner’s statutory right to exclude 
is exhausted once a product that fully embodies the patented invention is sold 
without limitation.53 
The policy behind the doctrine is that in an unconditional sale, the patent 
holder has negotiated a sale equivalent to the full value of the patented 
product.54 As a result, the doctrine of patent exhaustion only applies as a result 
of an authorized sale of the patented product by the patent holder.55 As the 
Supreme Court stated in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Manufacturing Co., “[T]he right to vend is exhausted by a single, 
unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly 
of the patent law and rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may 
attempt to put upon it.”56 Therefore, the unconditional sale of a patented 
product exhausts the patent owner’s right to control the use of the patented 
product.57 The purchaser may use and resell the product free of patent 
infringement but may not reproduce or copy the product.58 
2. Implication of Restrictive Licenses 
Parties to a transaction involving a patented product retain the freedom to 
contract regarding conditions placed on the patented article.59 Therefore, a 
patent owner may utilize restrictive licenses or “grant a license ‘upon any 
condition the performance of which is reasonably within the reward which the 
patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to secure.’”60 The Supreme Court 
has held that price-fixing and tying restrictions affixed to patented products are 
per se illegal.61 However, as long as a condition does not violate a principle of 
law or policy, such as patent, contract, anti-trust, or patent misuse law, parties 
 
 52. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 53. Amber Hatfield Rovner, Practical Guide to Application of (or Defense Against) 
Product-Based Infringement Immunities Under the Doctrines of Patent Exhaustion and Implied 
License, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 227, 229 (2004). 
 54. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 55. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942). 
 56. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917). 
 57. See Univis, 316 U.S. at 252; Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 58. Univis, 316 U.S. at 250. 
 59. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708. See also Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 
U.S. 124, 127 (1938) (“That a restrictive license is legal seems clear.”). 
 60. See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 305 U.S. at 127 (quoting United States v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926)). 
 61. See Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 516–17; Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 
U.S. 1, 17–18 (1913). 
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retain the freedom to contract and can agree to specific conditions.62 For a 
patent misuse defense, the license must have the overall effect of restraining 
competition unlawfully.63 Therefore, parties may contract as they choose, and 
“any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this 
kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the 
right to manufacture or use or sell the [patented] article, will be upheld by the 
courts.”64 
In addition, the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not apply when a license 
or sale is expressly conditional since, by inference, “the parties negotiated a 
price that reflects only the value of the ‘use’ rights conferred” by the patent 
holder.65 The relevant inquiry for the appropriateness of a restrictive license is 
whether the restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, or within the 
scope of the subject matter of the patent, or, if not, whether the patent holder’s 
restriction has an anticompetitive effect “not justifiable under the rule of 
reason.”66 
C. Genetically Engineered Plants and Utility Patents 
1. Development of Genetically Engineered Plants 
Under the regulations of the United States Department of Agriculture, 
genetic engineering is defined as “genetic modification of organisms by 
recombinant DNA techniques.”67 Generally, recombinant DNA techniques 
involve the isolation of DNA fragments, recombination of these fragments, and 
insertion into a living organism.68 The genotype, or genetic makeup, of plants 
can be altered by transferring genes for specific traits into a particular plant 
species.69 The desired genotype must still be selected by traditional techniques, 
yet recombinant DNA techniques allow for an increased probability of success 
in developing the desired plant trait.70 In addition, these techniques introduce 
 
 62. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703, 708. 
 63. Id. at 706. 
 64. Id. at 703 (quoting E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902)). See 
also Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 305 U.S. at 126 (stating that where a patented product is 
subject to different uses, a patent owner may legally restrict the purchase to a particular use). 
 65. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[E]xpress 
conditions accompanying the sale or license of a patented product are generally upheld.”). 
 66. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708 (“Anticompetitive effects that are not per se violations of 
law are reviewed in accordance with the rule of reason. Patent owners should be in a worse 
position, by virtue of the patent right to exclude, than owners of other property used in trade.”). 
 67. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2013). 
 68. DANIEL L. HARTL, BASIC GENETICS 420 (2d ed. 1991). 
 69. Id. at 6, 434. 
 70. Id. at 420. 
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genetic variation in plants that would not be possible with traditional plant 
breeding.71 
In 1996, the first GE agriculture plants, including herbicide-tolerant 
varieties, became commercially available.72 These herbicide-tolerant varieties, 
which allow for a single herbicide application, have increased yields and 
lowered farmers’ costs through decreased labor and machinery operation.73 As 
of 2007, over ninety percent of all soybean acres were planted with herbicide-
tolerant soybeans.74 Plant varieties tolerant to glyphosate (N-
phosphonomethylglycine)75 herbicides, like Monsanto Company’s (Monsanto) 
Roundup® product, have allowed for decreased reliance on other more toxic 
herbicides; however, the heavy reliance on glyphosate herbicides has resulted 
in the development of glyphosate-resistant weeds.76 
2. Utility Patents for Genetically Engineered Plants 
As decided in J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, whole 
plants, plant tissue, seeds, or cells, including GE plants, are patentable subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.77 In order to obtain a utility patent, the plant 
must meet the requirements under §§ 101–103 as new, useful, and 
nonobvious.78 In addition, the patentable GE plant must meet the specification 
requirement under § 112 requiring a written description to enable someone 
skilled in the trade to “make and use” the invention.79 
Advances in biological and genetic knowledge have enhanced a plant 
breeder’s ability to meet the requirements for a utility patent.80 While the 
requirements to obtain a general utility patent are more stringent than those 
under the PVPA, the protections provide a greater right of exclusion.81 For 
example, unlike the PVPA, the protections for plants under utility patents do 
not provide exemptions for research or saving seed.82 Therefore, the practice of 
saving seeds for planting the next season, once a common practice for 
 
 71. See id.; ERS Bulletin EIB-11, The First Decade of Genetically Engineered Crops in the 
United States 1 (U.S.D.A. 2006), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/255908/eib11_ 
1_.pdf. 
 72. ERS Bulletin EIB-88, supra note 1, at 51. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 76. ERS Bulletin EIB-88, supra note 1, at 52. 
 77. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 145 (2001). 
 78. Id. at 142. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 134. 
 81. Id. at 143. 
 82. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 143. 
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farmers,83 is not a right provided to purchasers of seed protected by utility 
patents.84 
Monsanto’s lineup of GE plants, including corn, soybeans, cotton, and 
other specialty crops, are protected by a number of patents.85 Monsanto’s 
Roundup Ready® technology was developed so that soybeans, among other 
plants, would be resistant to applications of glyphosate herbicides like 
Monsanto’s Roundup product.86 Roundup Ready soybeans are protected by 
two patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 5,352,605 (‘605 Patent) and RE39,247 E (‘247 
Patent).87 On October 4, 1994, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) granted Monsanto the ‘605 Patent for “chimeric genes which are 
capable of being expressed in plant cells, which utilize promoter regions 
derived from viruses which are capable of infecting plant cells.”88 The ‘247 
Patent, a reissue of U.S Patent No. 5,633,435, was issued on August 22, 2006, 
for glyphosate-tolerant 5-enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthases 
(EPSPS) including “[g]enes encoding Class II EPSPS enzymes . . . [that] are 
useful in producing transformed bacteria and plants which are tolerant to 
glyphosate herbicide.”89 These patents form the basis for Monsanto’s patent 
infringement litigation involving Roundup Ready soybeans.90 
3. Implication of the Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion 
Self-replicating technologies, like soybeans, complicate the determination 
of a patent holder’s rights under the utility patent.91 In addition, the application 
of the doctrine of patent exhaustion is not clear due to the technology’s ability 
to self-replicate.92 Since these technologies can self-replicate, thus creating 
new copies of the patented product, purchasers could continue to replicate the 
patented product, theoretically in perpetuity, putting the patent holder’s rights 
at risk.93 
 
 83. See Richard Schiffman, Life in the Rural Police State of Monsanto, TRUTHOUT (June 19, 
2013, 9:08 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/16985-life-in-the-rural-police-state-of-mon 
santo. 
 84. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 85. Product Patents, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/products/pages/product-pat 
ents.aspx#p2 (last visited June 3, 2014). 
 86. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 87. Id. 
 88. U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993). See also Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1343. 
 89. U.S. Patent No. RE39,247 E (filed July 18, 2003). See also Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1343. 
 90. See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1343; Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 91. Douglas Fretty, Note, Both a License and a Sale: How to Reconcile Self-Replicating 
Technology with Patent Exhaustion, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1, 2 (2011). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit determined that the doctrine of patent exhaustion was 
inapplicable to patented soybeans because the new seeds, or the copies of the 
original product, were never sold.94 Since the soybeans that were harvested 
from the original patented product, the “copies,” were never purchased from 
Monsanto, the doctrine of patent exhaustion did not apply.95 Moreover, the 
price paid for the original patented soybean seeds “reflected only the value of 
the ‘use’ rights conferred by the patentee.”96 As a result, the original sale of the 
patented soybeans did not confer a right to make copies.97 In addition, it is 
within the scope of the patent for Monsanto to restrict others, through the 
Technology Agreement, from making copies of the patented soybeans for the 
purposes of planting.98 
The same principles applied when a farmer purchased patented Roundup 
Ready soybeans without signing a License Agreement and saved seed for 
planting in subsequent growing seasons.99 The original purchase was 
conditioned on the farmer obtaining a license; therefore, whether a License 
Agreement was signed or not, the conditions still applied.100 Consequently, 
since the progeny soybean seeds, or copies of the originally purchased seed, 
were never sold, the doctrine of patent exhaustion did not apply.101 Self-
replicating technology “does not give a purchaser the right to use replicated 
copies of the technology” without restriction.102 Application of the doctrine of 
patent exhaustion in these situations would “eviscerate the rights of the patent 
holder.”103 
 
 94. McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1299. McFarling purchased Monsanto patented Roundup Ready 
soybeans and signed the Technology Agreement. Id. at 1293. He then saved 1500 bushels of the 
patented soybeans for planting the next season, in violation of the License Agreement. Id. 
McFarling repeated this practice the next season until Monsanto filed suit for patent infringement 
and breach of contract. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1299. 
 96. Id. (quoting B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs, 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1298. 
 99. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Scruggs argued that it 
purchased the Monsanto soybean seeds in an unrestricted sale, so the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion provided that Scruggs could use the soybean seeds as it saw fit. Id. at 1335. 
 100. Id. at 1336. 
 101. Id. (quoting McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1299). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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II.  MONSANTO CO. V. BOWMAN 
A. Factual Background 
Defendant Vernon Bowman regularly purchased soybean seeds containing 
Roundup Ready technology from Pioneer Hi-Bred (Pioneer), a Monsanto-
licensed seed producer.104 In conjunction with these purchases, Bowman 
executed the Pioneer Hi-Bred Technology Agreement, which is similar in 
language and scope to Monsanto’s Technology Agreement.105 Beginning in 
1999, Bowman planted Pioneer soybean seed containing Roundup Ready 
technology, and, pursuant to the Technology Agreement, did not save any seed 
from any of these plantings.106 
In addition to the licensed product, Bowman purchased commodity seed 
from a local grain elevator for a second-season planting, or “double-crop 
soybeans.”107 After planting, Bowman applied a glyphosate-based herbicide to 
the commodity seeds, killing weeds and any plants not glyphosate resistant, or 
more specifically not exhibiting the Roundup Ready trait.108 Following the 
harvest of the soybean crop produced from the commodity seed, Bowman 
saved some seed for planting the next season.109 Bowman also supplemented 
the saved seed with additional purchases of commodity seed from the grain 
elevator and continued this practice from the initial planting in 1999 to 2007, 
when Monsanto sued Bowman for patent infringement.110 
B. Monsanto’s Claim 
Monsanto argued that Bowman infringed on its patent by the unauthorized 
planting of commodity seed.111 In addition, Bowman saved seed harvested 
from the commodity seed and then planted successive generations of saved 
seed, along with additionally purchased commodity seed.112 All of these 
products included soybean seed containing the Roundup Ready trait.113 
 
 104. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. Grain elevators purchase seed from farmers and sell this commodity seed for 
consumption purposes. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (2013). A grain 
elevator is generally prohibited from packaging the commodity seed and selling it as agricultural 
seed. See 7 U.S.C. § 1571 (2006). 
 108. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765; Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345–46. 
 109. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1346. 
 110. Id.; Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (S.D. Ind. 2009). 
 111. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 836. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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Monsanto’s Technology Agreement authorizes farmers to sell seed to grain 
elevators as a commodity.114 However, Monsanto maintained that it owns and 
licenses the glyphosate resistant trait, and, therefore, the technology contained 
in all progeny seed belongs to Monsanto.115 While the seeds belong to the 
farmer, the technology belongs to Monsanto and may not be duplicated 
through planting without authorization from Monsanto.116 Since the Roundup 
Ready trait continues with each successive crop, Monsanto argued that without 
this restriction, farmers could purchase commodity soybeans and receive the 
benefit of the Roundup Ready trait without properly compensating Monsanto 
for the technology, thus circumventing the patent.117 
C. Bowman’s Defense 
Bowman contended that based on the doctrine of patent exhaustion, 
commodity seeds involve an authorized, unconditional sale from the farmer to 
the grain elevator, so Monsanto could no longer control the use of the soybean 
seeds.118 According to Bowman’s argument, when licensed soybeans 
containing the Roundup Ready trait are harvested and sold by the farmer to the 
grain elevator, the seeds are sold without restriction.119 Therefore, when this 
seed is mixed with seed from other farmers and sold as commodity seed, the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion applies to remove the commodity seed from 
patent protection.120 
Moreover, Bowman argued that Monsanto’s claim for patent protection for 
all seeds with Roundup Ready technology effectively eliminates the low-cost 
commodity seed option.121 The self-replicating nature of soybeans, which 
reproduces the Roundup Ready trait with each successive generation, further 
complicated the issue of farmers utilizing commodity seed.122 In addition, 
considering the domination of Roundup Ready soybeans in the market and the 
lack of separation at the grain elevator between seeds containing Roundup 
Ready technology and those without, the grain elevator’s commodity seed 
necessarily contains the Roundup Ready trait.123 Therefore, commodity seed 
purchased from most grain elevators would contain some proportion of 
patented product and could not be used for planting.124 Bowman argued that 
 
 114. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345. 
 115. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 837. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (2013). 
 119. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 836. 
 120. Id. See also Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 121. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 836–37. 
 122. Id. at 836. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 836–37. See also Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (2013). 
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providing Monsanto patent protection in the case of commodity seeds would 
“ʻcreat[e] an impermissible exception to the exhaustion doctrine’ for patented 
seeds and other ‘self-replicating technologies.’”125 
D. The Supreme Court’s Analysis 
1. Patent Exhaustion 
In addressing Bowman’s defense of patent exhaustion, the Court 
emphasized that the doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights related to the 
particular article sold but does not restrict the right to prevent copying of the 
patented product.126 A copy of the patented product brings about the patentee’s 
rights for a second time because the patentee only received the reward 
associated with the patent for the original product sold.127 Therefore, the Court 
reasoned that Bowman could resell the commodity seeds purchased from the 
elevator, consume the seeds, or feed the seeds to his animals, and Monsanto, 
based on the doctrine of patent exhaustion, would have no right to restrict these 
uses.128 
However, the doctrine does not confer the right to Bowman to make copies 
of the patented product without Monsanto’s authorization, express or 
implied.129 Consequently, when Bowman purchased and planted the 
commodity seed, sprayed the soybeans with glyphosate herbicide, and 
harvested the plants, he made new copies of the patented product, so the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion did not apply.130 
The Court explained that the above conclusion was necessary to balance 
the invention and reward.131 If patent exhaustion applied, Monsanto would 
receive the reward for the first sale of seed, but nothing would stop farmers or 
other companies from making consecutive copies of the original product 
without Monsanto receiving any reward.132 Therefore, the purchaser would 
receive the benefit of the invention or the Roundup Ready technology, but 
Monsanto would not be compensated for the repeated use of the copies of its 
invention.133 
 
 125. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 16, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 
(2013) (No. 11-796)). 
 126. Id. at 1766 (citing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942)). 
 127. Id. (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 
(1961); Univis, 316 U.S. at 251). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1767. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. 
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While Bowman contended he was merely “using” the patented product as 
it was intended, the Court refused to allow an exception to the rule that the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion does not permit the purchaser of a patented 
product to reproduce the product.134 The undiminished right of the patent 
holder to prohibit others from copying the patented product is consistent with 
the purpose of patent protection to create incentives for innovation, otherwise 
the patent would not last for twenty years but for only one sale of the 
product.135 
Moreover, the Court’s ruling did not limit farmers’ ability to utilize the 
product purchased.136 Under Monsanto’s Technology Agreement or another 
licensee’s technology agreement, a farmer can purchase seeds with Roundup 
Ready technology and produce copies of those seeds, through planting and 
harvesting, which may be sold as a commodity or consumed.137 As for the 
commodity seed utilized by Bowman, this seed may be consumed according to 
the intended and authorized use of the commodity seed purchased from grain 
elevators.138 In this context, Monsanto receives the reward for the soybean seed 
containing the Roundup Ready trait, and the farmer is also allowed to utilize 
and benefit from the technology or innovation.139 
2. Self-Replicating Products 
Bowman argued that the soybeans, as naturally self-replicating, created 
copies of Monsanto’s patented product without any influence or control by 
Bowman.140 The Court discredited this “blame-the-bean” defense.141 Bowman 
did not passively observe eight consecutive seasons of Roundup Ready 
soybean seed planting and harvesting.142 Rather, Bowman executed a unique 
plan by purchasing a grain elevator’s commodity seed, with knowledge that the 
seed would contain a majority of Roundup Ready seed.143 Bowman then 
selected the Roundup Ready plants by applying glyphosate-based herbicide.144 
Thus, Bowman actively participated in a planned process to produce 
successive crops of Roundup Ready soybeans without paying Monsanto for the 
patented product.145 
 
 134. Id. at 1768. 
 135. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768–69. 
 141. Id. at 1769. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769. 
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While the Court conceded that the self-replicating nature of soybeans 
played a role in the process, it emphasized Bowman’s control over the process 
of copying Monsanto’s patented product.146 However, the Court limited the 
holding to the particular factual circumstances of this case and failed to decide 
whether patent exhaustion would be applicable in other situations involving 
self-replicating technologies.147 Although the Court did not specifically address 
the instances which might exempt a purchaser of self-replicating technologies 
from patent infringement, or circumstances in which the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion would apply, the Court did indicate a couple of examples that are 
different from Bowman’s situation and would possibly result in a different 
conclusion.148 Specifically, the Court noted that self-replication may occur 
outside the purchaser’s control or may be a “necessary but incidental step in 
using the item for another purpose.”149 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Patent Exhaustion 
1. The Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion Is Inapplicable When a Purchaser 
Copies a Patented Product 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the doctrine of patent exhaustion in 
Bowman is consistent with other federal cases involving Roundup Ready 
technology150 and clearly indicates a distinction between “using” versus 
“copying” or “making” the patented product.151 While Bowman claimed the 
defense of patent exhaustion, the doctrine of patent exhaustion only applies to 
exhaust the patentee’s rights in the original patented article sold but does not 
confer a right to make additional copies of the product.152 The distinction 
regarding patented GE crops lies in what the farmer sees as “using” the 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1334–36 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. 
McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299–1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 151. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769; see also Jeremy N. Sheff, Self-Replicating 
Technologies, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 229, 238 (2013) (“[T]he application of the use/make 
distinction in the Roundup-Ready cases ignores the elephant in the room: the only and intended 
‘use’ of seeds or any other self-replicating technology necessarily ‘makes’ a newly infringing 
article—this is the defining characteristic of self-replicating technologies.”). 
 152. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(“[U]nconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s 
use of the device.”). See also B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
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patented product to grow soybean seed and what the Court ruled is “making” 
additional copies of the patented product.153 
Bowman recognized the seed containing Roundup Ready technology that 
he purchased from Pioneer was restricted according to the Technology 
Agreement, so he was not allowed to, and did not, save seed from the soybeans 
purchased under this agreement.154 When Bowman purchased this seed, his 
price reflected only the use rights conferred, and the new seeds, which had not 
been sold by the patentee, would not implicate the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion.155 Accordingly, mutual benefit arises between Monsanto, as the 
patent holder, and the farmer when the farmer is permitted to plant the 
Roundup Ready soybeans purchased under the license agreement and grow 
additional seed, which the farmer can then sell for profit as a commodity.156 
While the inapplicability of the doctrine of patent exhaustion is 
straightforward in the situation above where the farmer purchases patented 
seed under a license agreement,157 the analysis in this case was complicated by 
Bowman’s purchase of commodity seed from a grain elevator.158 When a 
farmer sells seed produced from a patented product, he cannot convey to the 
grain elevator the right to plant that seed, namely the commodity seed, because 
the farmer did not possess the right himself.159 Therefore, as a purchaser of 
commodity seed from a grain elevator, Bowman was not conferred the right to 
plant any commodity seed that contained patented product because the grain 
elevator did not have the right itself.160 
The patent holder, Monsanto, retained the right to restrict the making of 
additional patented product, and Monsanto did not confer to the purchaser of 
patented soybeans the right to produce seed beyond one generation.161 In 
addition, the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not provide any exemption for 
a purchaser to “copy” or “make” the patented product.162 Consequently, 
Bowman had no right to plant the commodity seed, select for soybeans 
containing the Roundup Ready trait by applying glyphosate-based herbicide, 
 
 153. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766–67 (“‘[M]ake’ means ‘cause to exist, occur, or appear,’ 
or more specifically, ‘plant and raise (a crop).’”). 
 154. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 155. See McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1298–99. 
 156. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768 (“No sane farmer, after all, would buy the product 
without some ability to grow soybeans from it. And so Monsanto, predictably enough, sells 
Roundup Ready seed to farmers with a license to use it to make a crop.”). 
 157. See id. at 1766. Bowman acknowledged “the ‘well settled’ principle ‘that the exhaustion 
doctrine does not extend to the right to ‘make’ a new product.’” Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner, 
supra note 125, at 37). 
 158. See id. at 1765. 
 159. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 839 (S.D. Ind. 2009). 
 160. See id. 
 161. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765–66. 
 162. Id. at 1766. 
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and harvest the progeny seeds, which were essentially additional copies of the 
patented product.163 
2. Could Bowman Have Altered His Procedure to Avoid Patent 
Infringement? 
Technically, Bowman was allowed to plant any non-patented product 
contained in the commodity seed he purchased, but Bowman intentionally 
removed these plants by applying glyphosate-based herbicide.164 Nevertheless, 
isolating the non-patented seed from the patented seed would be unrealistic, 
especially since nearly ninety-four percent of soybeans grown in Indiana at the 
time were herbicide resistant varieties and consequently likely protected by 
patent law.165 
Even if Bowman had not used a glyphosate-based herbicide to select for 
the plants containing Roundup Ready technology, he would have been 
prohibited from using the defense of patent exhaustion.166 Bowman was 
conscious of the prevalence of herbicide-resistant soybeans planted within the 
state and, in fact, regularly purchased patented soybeans himself.167 Therefore, 
he purchased the commodity seed with knowledge that a majority of the seed 
would contain the Roundup Ready trait.168 Moreover, Bowman would not have 
applied a glyphosate-based fertilizer that could potentially kill the entire crop 
unless he anticipated the majority of the commodity seed was resistant to 
glyphosate herbicide.169 
Given Bowman’s previous purchases of Roundup Ready soybeans and 
subsequent execution of a license agreement for each purchase, he was aware 
that the patented product sold to the grain elevator as a commodity could not 
be saved by the farmer for replanting.170 Therefore regardless of the herbicide 
chemistry Bowman used, by planting the commodity seed, Bowman was 
 
 163. See id. at 1766–67 (indicating that Bowman could resell the patented soybeans, consume 
the beans himself, or feed the seed to animals without restriction by Monsanto). 
 164. See id. 
 165. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 166. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766 (noting that the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not 
confer the right to Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s 
permission). 
 167. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769 (“[Bowman] purchased beans from a grain elevator 
anticipating that many would be Roundup Ready; applied a glyphosate-based herbicide in a way 
that culled any plants without the patented trait . . . .”). 
 170. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1344–45. 
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knowingly and intentionally making copies of patented product and infringing 
on Monsanto’s patent for Roundup Ready technology.171 
Even if Bowman had not “selected” for the patented product and instead 
used an alternative chemistry, Bowman was still aware that the majority of the 
commodity seed contained patented product that, per the License Agreement, 
could not be replanted.172 Realistically, Bowman used a glyphosate-based 
herbicide because of its convenience and efficiency and would be unwilling to 
switch chemistries,173 especially considering the remainder of his first-crop 
soybeans were glyphosate resistant and could be sprayed with glyphosate-
based herbicide.174 
3. Planting Commodity Seed: A Practice of the Past 
Bowman raised a policy argument that Monsanto should require its 
patented product to be kept separate, even at the grain elevator, or otherwise 
Monsanto retains a monopoly to control not only its patented product but other 
non-patented products incorporated with the undifferentiated commodity 
seed.175 Bowman used this policy argument as justification for the application 
of the doctrine of patent exhaustion to the situation where farmers purchase 
and plant commodity seed.176 Nevertheless, purchasing and planting 
commodity seed as a low-cost alternative to purchasing from a seed dealer has 
become a relic of the past.177 In 2013, considering that ninety-three percent of 
all soybeans planted in the United States were herbicide-resistant or herbicide-
tolerant varieties, it would be virtually impossible for a farmer to purchase 
commodity seed from a grain elevator that did not contain patented product.178 
 
 171. See id. at 1348 (“Even if Monsanto’s patent rights in the commodity seeds are exhausted, 
such a conclusion would be of no consequence because once a grower, like Bowman, plants the 
commodity seeds containing Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® technology and the next generation of 
seed develops, the grower has created a newly infringing article.”). 
 172. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769. 
 173. ERS Bulletin EIB-11, supra note 71, at 9–14. Herbicide-tolerant soybeans make weed 
control simpler and less time consuming, so farmers can control more weeds effectively. Id. In 
addition, herbicide-tolerant soybeans allow for reduced pesticide applications. Id. 
 174. See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345–46. 
 175. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768; Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 
(S.D. Ind. 2009). 
 176. See Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 837. 
 177. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768 (stating the commodity seed purchased by Bowman was 
intended for consumption, and the normal practice is for farmers to purchase commodity seed for 
this purpose). 
 178. Nat’l Agric. Statistics Serv., Genetically Engineered Varieties of Corn, Upland Cotton, 
and Soybeans, by State and for the United States, 2000–13, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (July 8, 2013), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-the-us.aspx. 
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Farmers may see hope on the horizon since the patent for Roundup Ready 
soybeans expired in 2014.179 In addition, Monsanto has stated that farmers can 
start saving seed from Roundup Ready varieties purchased following the 
expiration of the patent.180 However, farmers are permitted to save seed only 
for varieties developed by Monsanto breeders, whereas other varieties, or even 
Monsanto varieties licensed from a third party, may have variety patents that 
restrict the farmers’ ability to save seed.181 
Additionally, Monsanto’s Genuity® Roundup Ready 2 Yield® trait 
technology (Roundup Ready 2) is the second-generation Roundup technology 
that entered the market in 2009.182 In fact, a search of Monsanto’s lineup of 
soybean products only includes the Roundup Ready 2 soybean varieties.183 The 
patents for Roundup Ready 2 soybeans184 do not expire for a decade or 
more.185 Consequently, the continued purchase and planting of patented 
product will ensure the presence of patented product sold to grain elevators, 
and thus, commodity seed, as undifferentiated seed, will continue to include 
patented product.186 As long as commodity seed includes patented seed, which 
by law cannot by copied, a farmer’s ability to plant commodity seed is 
eliminated.187 
Perhaps this result is ultimately not bad for farmers. As technology 
becomes more advanced, new varieties are produced with better insertion 
events that optimize yield.188 In addition, herbicide-resistant crops have 
 
 179. See U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993); U.S. Patent No. RE39,247 E (filed 
July 18, 2003). 
 180. Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/ 
newsviews/pages/roundup-ready-patent-expiration.aspx (last visited June 4, 2014). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Soybean Seeds, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/products/Pages/soybean-
seeds.aspx (last visited June 6, 2014). 
 184. Product Patents: Soybeans, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/products/Pages/prod 
uct-patents.aspx (last visited June 6, 2014) (indicating that Monsanto’s Genuity Roundup Ready 2 
Yield Soybean varieties are protected by one or more of the following U.S. Patents Nos.: 
5,717,084; 5,728,925; 6,051,753; 6,660,911; 6,949,696; 7,141,722; 7,608,761; 7,632,985; 
8,053,184; RE39247). 
 185. Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, supra note 180. 
 186. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that 
Monsanto’s Technology Agreement permits the grower to sell seed to grain elevators as a 
commodity or to use the grain for feed). 
 187. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1766 & n.3 (2013) (finding that when 
Bowman reproduced Monsanto’s patented product, whether purchased from a grain elevator or a 
Monsanto authorized company, the doctrine of patent exhaustion did not protect him from patent 
infringement). 
 188. ERS Bulletin EIB-11, supra note 71, at 9 n.4 (stating the decreased yield that occurred in 
early varieties of herbicide-tolerant crops was eliminated by introducing the genes into higher 
yielding cultivars). 
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reduced herbicide use and allowed for application of herbicides that are more 
effective, less toxic, and cheaper than other herbicides.189 Thus, herbicide-
resistant crops have also impacted farmers’ bottom-lines through reduced costs 
and increased income. Moreover, GE crops have reduced input costs 
associated with machinery, fuel, and chemical usage.190 The environment has 
also benefited through reduced pesticide applications resulting in less chemical 
runoff and lower pesticide residues.191 
Additionally, better weed control has allowed greater implementation of 
reduced-tillage and no-till systems192 that improve soil quality and reduce soil 
loss.193 Therefore, while a farmer may be paying more for patented seed, that 
seed provides many benefits, and, considering that ninety-four percent of all 
soybeans planted are herbicide-resistant varieties, farmers obviously believe 
this benefit is worth the price.194 
Even if Bowman could have purchased lower-cost commodity seed free of 
any patented product, he would likely benefit instead from planting the higher 
priced, herbicide-resistant patented seed for his second-crop or “double-crop” 
soybeans.195 The second-crop soybeans typically have a lower production 
potential and profitability.196 Moreover, second-crop soybeans benefit from the 
flexibility and efficiency of herbicide-resistant seed.197 For example, farmers’ 
ability to use reduced tillage or no-till systems “allows additional time for 
planting, growing, and harvesting a second crop.”198 Therefore, when planting 
patented product, farmers can plant the double-crop soybeans sooner, 
optimizing growing conditions and increasing yield potential.199 
 
 189. Qaim, supra note 14. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Tillage Type Definitions, CONSERVATION TECH. INFO. CTR., http://www.ctic.purdue. 
edu/resourcedisplay/322/ (last visited June 6, 2014). No-till means “[t]he soil is left undisturbed 
from harvest to planting except for strips up to [one-third] of the row width (strips may involve 
only residue disturbance or may include soil disturbance).” Id. Reduced tillage means “[f]ull-
width tillage . . . involving one or more tillage trips which disturbs all of the soil surface and is 
performed prior to and/or during planting. There is 15–30 percent residue cover after planting 
. . . .” Id. 
 193. Qaim, supra note 14. 
 194. See ERS Bulletin EIB-11, supra note 71, at 8 (“Farmers are more likely to adopt new 
practices and technologies if they expect to benefit from them.”). 
 195. See Brookes & Barfoot, supra note 6, at 190 (noting that second-crop soybeans are 
“facilitated substantially by the ease of management” of the herbicide-tolerant patented 
soybeans). 
 196. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (2013) (stating that Bowman 
considered the second-crop soybeans as “risky”). 
 197. Brookes & Barfoot, supra note 6, at 190. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. 
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Nevertheless, Bowman claimed he would be negatively impacted if his 
ability to plant the lower-cost commodity seed was eliminated.200 Bowman’s 
policy argument on the surface appears justified.201 Monsanto, as the patent 
holder, seems to be granted a monopoly over not only its patented product, but 
also a majority of the soybean crop.202 Yet, Bowman’s policy argument falls 
apart when considering the benefits Bowman received from planting the 
commodity seed, which was essentially comprised of patented Roundup Ready 
soybeans.203 Bowman received all the benefits of the patented product without 
paying the cost associated with those benefits.204 Furthermore, Bowman 
received these benefits at a price much less than the price other farmers paid 
for the same patented product.205 
Moreover, Bowman obviously desired the benefits of the patented product 
because he applied glyphosate-based herbicide to his second-season crop to 
specifically select for the patented plants.206 Basically, Bowman wanted 
authority to purchase patented product at a low cost, plant the patented 
soybeans, repeatedly copy the patented seed, save the copies for successive 
plantings, and sell a portion of his harvest without compensating the patent 
holder, Monsanto.207 No policy is served by allowing Bowman to entirely 
circumvent the principles of patent law.208 
 
 200. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836–37 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (“As 
Bowman points out, Monsanto’s domination of the soybean seed market, combined with the 
regeneration of the Roundup Ready® trait and the lack of any restriction against the mixing of 
soybeans harvested from a Roundup Ready® crop from those that are harvested from a crop that 
was not grown from Roundup Ready® seed, has resulted in the commodity soybeans sold by 
grain dealers necessarily carrying the patented trait, thereby eliminating commodity soybeans as a 
low cost (but higher risk) source for planting.”). 
 201. Id. at 837. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (2013). 
 204. See id. at 1767 (observing Monsanto received no reward from Bowman’s annual 
production and sale of his second-season crop of Roundup Ready soybeans). 
 205. For example, Monsanto’s 2014 price list for Roundup Ready 2 Soybeans includes prices 
from $51.00 to $67.00 per unit for Roundup Ready 2 soybeans and from $41.00 to $45.00 for 
conventional soybeans. MONSANTO CO., ASGROW® SOYBEAN SUGGESTED RETAIL PRICE 
(2014). According to the commodity trading market, March 2014 soybean futures were priced at 
$13.38. Soybean Futures Quotes, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/agricultural/ 
grain-and-oilseed/soybean.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 206. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765 (“[Bowman] . . . sprayed his fields with glyphosate to kill 
weeds (and any non-resistant plants), and produced a new crop of glyphosate-resistant—i.e., 
Roundup Ready—soybeans.”). 
 207. See id. at 1767. Following Bowman’s argument, Monsanto would receive its reward for 
the first sale of any patented invention. Id. Subsequently, any farmer or seed company could then 
proceed to make copies of the invention without compensating Monsanto. Id. 
 208. See id. (observing that if the doctrine of patent exhaustion protected Bowman’s 
activities, “Monsanto’s patent would provide scant benefit”). 
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B. Holding Necessary to Incentivize Innovation 
The purpose of patent protection is to promote innovation, research, and 
scientific discovery, which ultimately benefits society economically and 
socially.209 In light of these goals, the scope and applicability of patent laws 
have been interpreted broadly to accommodate changing technology and new 
and unforeseen inventions.210 These goals provide the foundation for the 
application of the patent exhaustion doctrine only to the particular item sold.211 
When a purchaser copies the patented article, the doctrine of patent exhaustion 
becomes inapplicable to protect the rights of the patent holder.212 
If the doctrine of patent exhaustion did apply, the patent holder would be 
compensated for its patent only when the first patented seeds were sold.213 
Subsequently, farmers would not need to purchase additional patented seeds 
but could “make” additional product without compensating the patent 
holder.214 Perhaps a farmer would occasionally want to supplement his seed 
with new patented product.215 However, these periodic purchases would not 
incentivize the patent holder, like Monsanto, to continue funding research to 
develop cutting-edge technology.216 Additionally, if Monsanto were forced to 
price the first sale of patented product at a level to recoup its research and 
development costs, no farmer would be able to afford to purchase the 
product.217 
Bowman’s actions are even worse because he never compensated the 
patent holder.218 Monsanto was compensated by the first sale of Roundup 
 
 209. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001). 
 210. Id. at 131, 135 (“A rule that unanticipated inventions are without protection would 
conflict with the core concept of the patent law that anticipation undermines patentability.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980))). 
 211. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766. 
 212. Id. (“‘[A] second creation’ of the patented item ‘call[s] the monopoly, conferred by the 
patent grant, into play for a second time.’” (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961))). 
 213. Id. at 1767. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. at 1765 (stating sometimes Bowman supplemented his saved seed with additional 
commodity seed purchased from the grain elevator). 
 216. See Corporate Profile, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/investors/Pages/corpo 
rate-profile.aspx (last visited June 6, 2014) (noting that Monsanto invested more than $1.5 billion 
last fiscal year on research and development). 
 217. See Sheff, supra note 151, at 243. If the doctrine of patent exhaustion did not apply, 
“Monsanto might only be able recoup [sic] its investments in Roundup-Ready technology by 
selling its first generation of seeds to individual farmers for thousands (millions?) of dollars per 
bag.” Id. 
 218. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765. 
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Ready soybeans, which were then sold to the grain elevator.219 Yet, Monsanto 
was not compensated when Bowman purchased from the grain elevator the 
commodity seed containing copies of Monsanto’s patented traits.220 In fact, 
Bowman purchased this seed specifically because it was cheaper than 
purchasing patented product from an authorized dealer.221 Bowman sprayed his 
plants grown from the commodity seed with glyphosate-based herbicide to 
select for the patented product, saved some of this seed for the next season, and 
supplemented with additional commodity seed purchases when necessary.222 In 
addition, Bowman continued this process for eight seasons.223 Therefore, 
Bowman received the benefit of the patented product for eight years of second 
season or “double-crop” soybeans without any compensation to the patent 
holder.224 
In this scenario, Monsanto spends valuable time, money, and other 
resources on developing desirable patented soybean seed without receiving any 
reward from Bowman.225 If Monsanto is not compensated for its invention, 
what would incentivize Monsanto to continue developing new patented 
product?226 How can the goal of promoting innovation be achieved when 
Monsanto has no incentive to invent and especially share its invention with 
society?227 While Monsanto’s product may be more expensive than other 
available products or previously produced non-patented seed, Monsanto is free 
to charge the price that the market can sustain.228 Moreover, purchasers are 
free to purchase other soybean seed, patented or non-patented, from Monsanto 
or other seed dealers.229 However, a farmer who desires a superior product 
should expect to pay a price proportional to the benefits received.230 
 
 219. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that 
Monsanto’s License Agreement authorizes farmers to sell the progeny of the original patented 
product to grain elevators as a commodity). 
 220. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765. 
 221. See id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. 
 225. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (S.D. Ind. 2009). 
 226. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1767 (“The exhaustion doctrine is limited to the ‘particular 
item’ sold to avoid just such a mismatch between invention and reward.”). 
 227. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and the useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 228. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 229. Id. at 1298. 
 230. See id. 
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C. Monsanto’s Technology Agreement—Mutual Benefits 
Monsanto, or an authorized company, sells patented seed conditioned upon 
the Technology Agreement, which restricts farmers to growing a crop for a 
single season.231 Restrictive licenses are legal as long as the condition is 
reasonably within the reward the patentee expects to receive.232 Monsanto’s 
Technology Agreement has been found to be a valid and legal restriction of the 
sale of patented seed.233 
While Monsanto conditioned the purchase of patented seed on the farmers 
planting only a single crop season without saving seed, the farmer was not 
restricted from purchasing different seed in subsequent seasons.234 “Monsanto 
has a right to exclude others from making, using, or selling its patented plant 
technology, and its no replant policy simply prevents purchasers of the seeds 
from using the patented biotechnology when that biotechnology makes a copy 
of itself.”235 Therefore, “[t]his restriction . . . is a valid exercise of its rights 
under the patent laws.”236 
Monsanto realized that its patented seed was most useful when a farmer 
could plant the patented product and harvest the progeny seeds to sell as a 
commodity.237 Therefore, Monsanto provides a license to farmers to “make” 
additional patented product, so long as the farmer only sells the seed as a 
commodity and does not save any seed for planting.238 The license agreement 
provides a means for both the farmer and the patent holder to benefit from the 
patented product.239 
While Bowman did not sign a license agreement when purchasing 
commodity seed, Monsanto’s Technology Agreement still limits Bowman’s 
use of the seed.240 When farmers sell seed to the grain elevator, no 
unconditional sale of the patented technology occurs.241 The farmer cannot 
convey to the grain elevator a right that he does not possess himself.242 
 
 231. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Bowman, 133 
S. Ct. at 1764. 
 232. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704–05 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting 
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926)). 
 233. See McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1298–99. 
 234. Id. at 1298. 
 235. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1340 (citation omitted). 
 236. Id. 
 237. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (2013). 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 839 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (noting that 
Monsanto’s License Agreement specifically excludes planting progeny seed, so no right could be 
conferred to Bowman). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
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Therefore, the grain elevator did not have the right to plant seed containing the 
patented trait and could not convey that right to Bowman.243 Accordingly, both 
the Technology Agreement and patent law, through prohibiting a purchaser 
from making a patented product, restrict Bowman’s ability to plant commodity 
seed containing patented product.244 Bowman was free to purchase different 
seed from another seed dealer,245 perhaps seed that would have been 
cheaper,246 but was restricted from planting patented product without 
appropriately compensating the patent holder.247 
D. Self-Replicating Technology 
Self-replicating technologies complicate the application of patent law and 
the overall purpose of promoting innovation.248 Formerly only a theory of 
science fiction,249 self-replicating technologies are common in certain 
industries and, as a result of scientific advancement and innovation, are 
becoming more complex and dynamic than ever before.250 The application of 
the doctrine of patent exhaustion for self-replicating technologies was 
questioned after the Supreme Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG 
Electronics, Inc.251 held that “[t]he authorized sale of an article that 
substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents 
the patent holder from invoking patent law to control postsale use of the 
article.”252 
Bowman tried to capitalize on this uncertainty following Quanta and 
argued the doctrine of patent exhaustion applies to patented soybeans.253 
Bowman claimed that each seed sold “substantially embodied” subsequent 
generations of seed, and, therefore, a licensed farmer’s sale of progeny seed 
involves an authorized, unconditional sale of the patented soybeans.254 
Consequently, that unrestricted sale exhausts the patent as to those patented 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 245. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (recognizing the 
option of over two hundred commercial soybean products, including herbicide-tolerant varieties). 
 246. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (observing that 
according to Monsanto’s License Agreement, farmers are required to pay a technology fee when 
purchasing patented seed). 
 247. See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1347–48. 
 248. Sheff, supra note 151, at 231. 
 249. Id. at 230. 
 250. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013). 
 251. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 617 (2008). 
 252. Id. at 638. See also Kevin Rodkey, Exhaustion and Validity of Single-Use Licenses for 
Transgenic Seeds in the Wake of Quanta v. LG Electronics, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 579, 596 (2010); 
Sheff, supra note 151, at 239. 
 253. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 254. See id.; Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 838 (S.D. Ind. 2009). 
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soybeans.255 Bowman advocated, under Quanta, for a broad application of the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion that would generally apply to self-replicating 
technologies.256 
Nevertheless, Bowman’s broad interpretation of the holding in Quanta is 
of little consequence.257 A farmer’s sale of progeny seed is expressly restricted 
by Monsanto’s Technology Agreement.258 Therefore, the transaction is not an 
authorized unconditional sale that exhausts Monsanto’s patent but is only 
authorized when conditioned upon that seed not being planted.259 Without an 
unrestricted sale, the doctrine of patent exhaustion is not implicated, and, 
consequently, the interpretation of Quanta is irrelevant.260 
Moreover, previous patent infringement cases involving GE soybean seed 
support this conclusion.261 Purchasing patented seed from Monsanto involves a 
valid, restricted sale,262 and the newly grown and harvested seed, authorized by 
the license agreement, does not implicate the doctrine of patent exhaustion 
because those seeds were never purchased from the patent holder.263 Thus, 
whether the purchased seed “substantially embodies” the new seed or not, the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion does not apply for a restricted sale.264 
Even unrestricted sales do not confer the right to make copies simply 
because the technology is self-replicating.265 If Monsanto’s patent rights were 
exhausted, Bowman still does not have the right to copy the patented product, 
creating a newly infringing article.266 Ultimately, “[t]he fact that a patented 
technology can replicate itself does not give a purchaser the right to use 
replicated copies of the technology.”267 Patent holders whose product naturally 
 
 255. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 838. 
 256. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1346. 
 257. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 839. 
 258. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 
459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002). 
 259. See Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 839. 
 260. See id. Unlike Quanta, no unconditional sale occurred and the grain elevator “had no 
right to plant the soybeans and could not confer such a right on Bowman.” Id. 
 261. See, e.g., Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336; McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1299. 
 262. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336. 
 263. McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1299. 
 264. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The court disagreed 
with Bowman’s Quanta argument “because nothing in the record indicates that the ‘only 
reasonable and intended use’ of commodity seed is for replanting them to create new seed.” Id. 
(quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 631 (2008)). 
 265. Id. (“The right to use ‘do[es] not include the right to construct an essentially new article 
on the template of the original, for the right to make the article remains with the patentee.’” 
(quoting Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001))). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
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self-replicates still deserve the same protections afforded other products under 
patent law.268 Otherwise, “[a]pplying the first sale doctrine to subsequent 
generations of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights of the 
patent holder.”269 Accordingly, the right to make the patented product remains 
with the patent holder.270 
The Supreme Court also did not find Bowman’s “seeds-are-special 
argument” convincing.271 Yet, the Court limited its holding to Bowman’s 
particular situation, refusing to apply the holding to all cases involving self-
replicating technology.272 Nevertheless, the Court clearly indicated that in 
certain situations the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not protect individuals 
from liability for infringing on patents for self-replicating technologies.273 
The factor influencing the Court’s holding in Bowman was that Bowman 
exerted a level of control.274 Indeed, Bowman was systematically involved in 
selecting the patented Roundup-Ready seed.275 Through planting commodity 
seed, spraying the soybeans with glyphosate-based herbicide, and harvesting 
the progeny or copies of the self-replicating technology, Bowman actively 
participated in making Monsanto’s patented product.276 
Nevertheless, one can conceive of situations that would involve replication 
of the technology outside the purchaser’s control or incidental to the 
purchaser’s activities.277 Since the Court limited the holding in Bowman, 
determining the application of the doctrine of patent exhaustion to these 
situations and what level of “control” warrants infringement are unclear.278 
However, this issue was recently discussed in Organic Seed Growers & Trade 
Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., a case that was dismissed for lack of a justiciable case 
or controversy.279 In that case, organic farmers and other associations were 
seeking a declaratory judgment and Monsanto’s express waiver of any claim 
for patent infringement against them.280 These entities, which grow, use, or sell 
only conventional seed, were concerned that incidental contamination from 
 
 268. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F.3d at 1102). 
 271. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768–69 (2013). 
 272. Id. at 1769. 
 273. See id. 
 274. Id. at 1768–69. 
 275. Id. at 1769. 
 276. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
 280. Id. at 1352, 1354. 
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transgenic seed would subject them to patent infringement suits from 
Monsanto.281 
Monsanto explicitly contended that it would not take legal action against 
growers whose fields inadvertently contained trace amounts of patented 
product.282 However, the threshold requirement of “trace” or “minimal” 
quantities was not defined.283 Is the limit one percent, as suggested by the 
organic farming organizations?284 Monsanto did not contest this threshold, yet 
offered no firm, enforceable limit.285 Moreover, courts have determined that de 
minimus or trace amounts, or even one molecule, of a patented product can be 
construed as infringement.286 While Monsanto may be judicially estopped from 
later adopting a contrary position in a case involving the same patents as those 
in Organic Seed Growers,287 that fact provides little guidance to individuals 
concerned about infringing the patents of the many other self-replicating 
technologies. 
Though there is no clear guidance, the decision, as stated above, will likely 
be governed by the issue of control.288 Indeed, the Court in Bowman 
emphasized that patent exhaustion provides no protection when an individual, 
like Bowman, intentionally makes copies of the patented product.289 Moreover, 
Monsanto, as the patent holder, was deprived of the reward provided under 
patent law.290 In contrast, organic farmers exert substantial effort to control the 
integrity of their system and avoid contamination by GE crops.291 In fact, 
organic farmers must take precautions to avoid contamination in order to 
maintain organic certification.292 Despite the efforts of organic farmers, 
 
 281. Id. at 1353. 
 282. Id. at 1357–58. 
 283. See id. at 1358. 
 284. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1358. 
 285. Id. Indeed, Monsanto resisted clarification of “whether it would assert its patents against 
a conventional grower who inadvertently uses or sells greater than trace amounts of modified 
seed, but who, for example, does not make use of the Roundup Ready trait by spraying the plants 
with glyphosate.” Id. at 1359. 
 286. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2009); SmithKline 
Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. 
Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 287. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1358. 
 288. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1360. Organic farming operations take precautions 
such as testing seeds for transgenic traits and creating buffer or set-back zones between their 
farmers and neighbor’s farmers containing GE crops. Id. at 1353–54. 
 292. Id. at 1360. 
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contamination still occurs.293 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
risk of “gene flow” from GE crops into conventional crops.294 
While the organic farming organizations in Organic Seed Growers had not 
sustained greater than trace contamination, an organic farmer who exercises 
the utmost control and precaution in limiting contamination by GE crops, yet 
still experiences greater than trace contamination, should not be liable for 
patent infringement.295 Although contamination at greater than trace amounts 
in this type of situation is currently not highly likely to occur,296 the risk 
increases as GE crops become more prolific.297 Nevertheless, an organic 
farmer has a responsibility to limit contamination298 but cannot reasonably be 
expected to eliminate all contamination, or even greater than trace amounts of 
contamination in certain situations.299 Moreover, an organic farmer would 
prefer to eliminate all contamination from GE crops but, due to the nature of 
contamination by wind-blown pollen and gene-flow, probably cannot.300 
In spite of this contamination, the patent holder is not deprived of the 
reward provided by patent law because the organic farmer did not purchase GE 
crops, did not apply Roundup herbicide, and was not intentionally trying to 
create copies of the patented product.301 Therefore, each situation of possible 
infringement involving self-replicating technologies should be determined on 
the basis of how much the individual controls the system as well as the 
inadvertent nature of any infringement.302 
CONCLUSION 
In the agriculture industry, the self-replicating nature of GE seed 
complicates the application of the doctrine of patent exhaustion and the 
determination of a patent holder’s rights under patent law. The Supreme Court 
examined this issue in Bowman and correctly concluded the doctrine of patent 
 
 293. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto, 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). Despite efforts to control contamination, “some unlicensed—and unintended—use of 
transgenic seeds is inevitable. Like any other seeds, transgenic seeds may contaminate non-
transgenic crops through a variety of means, including seed drift or scatter, crosspollination, and 
commingling via tainted equipment during harvest or post-harvest activities, processing, 
transportation, and storage.” Id. 
 294. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754–55 (2010). 
 295. See Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1356 (citing Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769). 
 296. Id. at 1359. 
 297. Id. at 1357. 
 298. Id. at 1360. 
 299. See Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto, 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 548 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 300. Id. 
 301. See Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1359. 
 302. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] PATENT EXHAUSTION AND SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES 217 
exhaustion did not apply. Regardless of where the product is purchased, the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion does not protect individuals who copy the 
patented product. Moreover, the ability of a patented product to self-replicate 
does not, as a result, confer the right to a purchaser to make or copy the 
patented product. 
Accordingly, seed companies that own the patent rights for GE plants may, 
in conjunction with license agreements, restrict a farmer’s use of patented GE 
plants. These restrictions also apply when a farmer plants commodity soybean 
seed that contains patented product. While the Court’s decision effectively 
removes the farmer’s option to plant and save commodity seed, or save any 
patented seed, it consequently supports the purpose of patent law to promote 
innovation and ensures the patent holder receives the reward provided for 
under the patent. Furthermore, protection of self-replicating technologies from 
patent infringement will incentivize technological development in many 
industries, including genetics and biotechnology. 
The Court limited its holding to Bowman’s particular situation, refusing to 
apply the holding to all cases involving self-replicating technologies. 
Nevertheless, the Court indicated that in certain situations the doctrine of 
patent exhaustion may protect an individual from liability for patent 
infringement. The Court’s holding in Bowman, and ultimately any other case 
involving self-replicating technologies, was influenced by whether the self-
replication occurred outside the individual’s control or was unintentional. 
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